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A CHALLENGE TO THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE
REQUIREMENT OF THE JUROR QUALIFICATION PROVISION
OF NEW YORK'S JUDICIARY LAW
I. INTRODUCTION

New York state law requires jurors to read, write, and speak the
English language with a degree of proficiency.'
The Hispanie 2
population in New York City has steadily increased from 16.3% in 1970

to 19.9% in 1980 to 24.4% in 1990.'

United States Census Bureau

statistics reveal that approximately half of the Hispanic-surnamed

population over five years of age in New York, Bronx, Kings, Queens,
and Richmond counties, speak Spanish as their primary language.4 The
1. N.Y. JuD. LAw § 510 (McKinney 1992). The section reads:
In order to qualify as a juror a person must:
1. Be a citizen of the United States, and a resident of the county.
2. Be not less than eighteen years of age.
3. Not have a mental or physical condition, or combination thereof, which
causes the person to be incapable of performing in a reasonable manner the
duties of a juror.
4. Not have been convicted of a felony.
5. Be intelligent, of good character, able to read and write the English
language with a degree of proficiency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily the
juror qualification questionnaire, and be able to speak the English language in
an understandable manner.
2. The term "Hispanic" is used throughout this note to refer to all Spanish-speaking
United States citizens, regardless of their country of origin. "Hispanic" is used by the
U.S. Census Bureau for the same purpose. The author recognizes that others have
argued in favor of other appellations such as "Latino" and "Latin American," the latter
referring specifically to those from Central and South America as distinguished from
those from Spain. Hispanics were selected for this analysis because they are among the
largest non-English speaking group in New York City. Nonetheless, the same arguments
could be extended to Asian Americans or any other non-English speaking group which
constitutes a significant portion of the population.
3. David Gonzdlez, DominicanImmigrationAlters HispanicNew York, N.Y. TIMRES,
Sept. 1, 1992, at Al.
4. See BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF CommRCE, 1990 CENSUS OF
POPULATION AND HOUsING: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARAcrERISTICS-NEW YORK
340-44 (1991) [hereinafter CENSUS] (Table 138: Nativity, Citizenship, Year of Entry,
Area of Birth, and LanguageSpoken at Home: 1990). In New York County (Manhattan)
337,801 people were five years or older and spoke a language other than English, and
that language was Spanish; 181,592 or 12.2% of the total population did not speak
English very well. Id. at 343. In Bronx County, 428,376 people were five years or
older and spoke a language other than English, and that language was Spanish; 208,991
or 17.4% of the total population did not speak English very well. Id. at 340. In Kings

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

exclusion of these non-English speaking Hispanic New Yorkers from jury
duty by Section 510 of the New York Judiciary Law,5 which fists juror

qualification requirements, is the focus of this note.
This note will examine whether the New York juror qualification
provision of New York's Judiciary Law, which bars non-English speaking
citizens from jury service, violates not only the Sixth Amendment but also
the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and the New York State
Constitutions.6 The Sixth Amendment analysis examines whether the

statute results in substantial or gross underrepresentation, if not systematic
exclusion from jury pools of Hispanics, who constitute a cognizable group
of qualified citizens. 7 The effect of this would be to deny the defendant
a fair and impartial trial by a jury drawn from a cross section of the

community."
The Equal Protection Clause analysis examines whether the statute is
presumptively unconstitutional because: 1) the State fails to treat similarly-

situated individuals alike with respect to the legislature's objectives in
enacting the law;9 2) the legislature acted for an impermissible

County (Brooklyn), 382,469 people were five years or older and spoke a language other
than English, and that language was Spanish; 180,508 or 7.8 % of the total population did
not speak English very well. Id. at 342. In Queens County, 330,098 people were five
years or older and spoke a language other than English, and that language was Spanish;
173,643 or 8.9% of the total population did not speak English very well. Id. at 344.
In Richmond County (Staten Island), 19,804 people were five years or older and spoke
a language other than English, and that language was Spanish; 6,948 or 1.8% of the total
population did not speak English very well. Id. For general information on population
and housing, see BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMIERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF
POPULATION AND HOUSING: SUMMARY POPULATION AND HOUSING
CHARACrERISTICS-NEW YORK 107 (1991) (Table 4: Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin:
1990). The 1990 population figures for the New York area are: New York County
population, 1,487,536; Bronx County population, 1,203,789; Kings County population,
2,300,664; Queens County population, 1,951,598; Richmond County (Staten Island)
population, 378,977. Id.
5. See N.Y. JuD. LAW § 510 (McKinney 1992).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §1; N.Y.CONST. art. I, §
11:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any
subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion,
be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other person or by
any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or
subdivision of the state.
7. See discussion infra part II.B-C.
8. See discussion infra part III.A.
9. See infra notes 189-202 and accompanying text.
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purpose; or 3) the State is denying Hispanic citizens a fundamental
right by assuming that their lack of knowledge of the English language
makes them incapable of performing jury service."
I1. RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY DRAWN FROM A CROSS SECTION
OF THE COMMUNITY

A. The Cross-Section Requirement
A criminal defendant is entitled to a jury drawn "at random from a
fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the
court convenes." 12 The Supreme Court has consistently held this to be
a fundamental right"3 guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 4
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has suggested that non-discriminatory
jury selection, which is mandated by both the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment," is an essential element

in a democratic system."6

In Thiel v. Southern Pacific,7 the Court

wrote:

10. See infra notes 203-210 and accompanying text.
11. See discussion infra part VIII.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
13. See, e.g., Holland v. Louisiana, 493 U.S. 472 (1990) (holding that a criminal
defendant has standing to challenge exclusion of jurors resulting in a violation of the fair
cross-section requirement, whether or not he is a member of the excluded class); Taylor
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 525 (1975) (striking down a law exempting women from
jury service on the basis that it violated the fair cross-section requirement).
14. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[ii]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ....
" U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
15. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o state shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.' CONST. amend. XIV, §
1.
16. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85-86 (1942) (holding, in a
case where only women from the local League of Women Voters were selected for jury
lists, that "our democracy itself, requires that the jury be a 'body truly representative of
the community,' and not the organ of any special group or class"); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1879) (ruling that a statute excluding Blacks from
serving on juries violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
17. 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (ruling that the informal practice of excluding daily wage
earners from jury service without their consent was illegal).
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The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection
with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates
an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community.
(citation omitted). This does not mean, of course, that every jury
must contain representatives of all the economic, social, religious,
racial, political and geographical groups of the community;
frequently such complete representation would be impossible. But
it does mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by court
officials without systematic and intentional exclusion of any of
these groups. Recognition must be given to the fact that those
eligible for jury service are to be found in every stratum of
society. Jury competence is an individual rather than a group or
class matter. That fact lies at the very heart of the jury system.
To disregard it is to open the door to class distinctions and
discriminations which are abhorrent to the democratic ideals of
trial by jury."8
It is a well-established principle that the state cannot systematically or
purposefully deny members of a defendant's race or group, or those of
any other group, the right to participate as jurors, because a jury from
which distinct groups have been systematically excluded is not
representative of the community. 9 The Supreme Court has consistently
required that jury selection systems at both the federal and state court
levels draw jurors from a fair cross section of the community.' While
18. Id. at 220 (emphasis added).
19. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 481-82 (1954) (declaring that a
prima facie case of discrimination existed when no Mexican Americans had served on

county juries for a twenty-five year period, even though they comprised a substantial
percentage of the county's population); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1879)

(holding that a county court judge may not exclude segments of the community from jury
duty).
20. See, e.g., Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970)
(holding that members of a group systematically excluded from jury service-African
Americans-havestanding to attack juror selection laws); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,
473-74 (1953) (recognizing the authority of states to specify qualifications for prospective

state jurors, "so long as the source reasonably reflects a cross-section of the population
suitable in character and intelligence for that civic duty"); Ballard v. United States, 329
U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946) (declaring that women may not be excluded from federal juries
because their exclusion makes the jury less representative of the community); Thiel v.
Southern Pac. Co. 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (addressing the common practice of
excluding daily wage earners from lists of prospective jurors, the Court stated that
"prospective jurors shall be selected by court officials without systematic and intentional
exclusion .... Recognition must be given to the fact that those eligible for jury service
are to be found in every stratum of society.").
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allowing "greater latitude" to the States "in fashioning their jury selection
procedures,"" the Court has nonetheless insisted that the state court
"protect the federal constitutional rights of all" by utilizing sources for
jury lists that "reasonably reflect- a cross-section of the population
suitable in character and intelligence for that civic duty."'
B. Cognizability and Its Relationship to the
FairCross-Section Requirement

The Supreme Court views juries as a safeguard against the exercise
of arbitrary power and the means by which the common sense judgment
of the community is provided.

3

Consistent with this concept is the

requirement that juries be "drawn from a source fairly representative of
the community. .

."' Ideally, juries would reflect a true cross section,

but that is not constitutionally mandated.'
Accordingly, the crosssection requirement does not mean "that petit juries actually chosen must
mirror the community."' "What is required is a jury system that is free
of discrimination against properly cognizable groups."'
These
cognizable groups are distinct categories of people who are capable of
being singled out for different treatment under the law.'
Neither an
exact statistical mirror nor perfectly proportional representation of all
identifiable classes or groups of a community is required to satisfy the
cross-section requirement. 9 The selection process, however, must be
reasonably designed to produce a fair cross section.' While significant
21. Alexanderv. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625,637 n.4 (1972) (Douglas, J.concurring).
22. Carter,396 U.S. at 332-33. (Stewart, J., quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
433, 474 (1953).
This note considers the state court jury selection process as
administered in New York City.
23. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
24. Id. at 538.
25. United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 572 (1st Cir. 1970) (holding that the
Constitution's mandate for non-discriminatory jury selection is not frustrated simply by
the existence of certain inadvertent disparities arising from an otherwise fair system).
26. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538.
27. Butera, 420 F.2d at 572.
28. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-79 (1954).
29. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
30. United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 143-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd,
468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973) (holding that 18 to 21
year olds do not have a constitutional right to serve on juries, and that they do not
constitute a "cognizable group" for jury selection purposes). See also United States v.
Van Allen, 208 F. Supp. 331, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (holding that defendants failed to
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disparities in the exclusion of certain groups from jury pools may not

automatically be considered unconstitutional, they do suggest
discrimination; once this inference is raised, the State must negate it by
showing that the disparities are not the result of discrimination.31
1. Supreme Court Test
In Duren v. Missouri,32 the Supreme Court enunciated a three-prong
test under which a defendant can establish a prima facie violation of the
"cross-section" principle.'
First, the exclusion of a cognizable or
distinctive group in the community must be demonstrated.' Second, it
must be shown that representation of this group in the venire or jury pool
is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such people in the
community.35 Third, it must be established that the group's
underrepresentation is the result of a systematic exclusion of the group
from the jury selection process.'
The three prongs of the Duren test are satisfied by the New York
statute's effect on the jury participation of non-English speaking Hispanics.
First, the English-speaking requirement results in the exclusion of 48.1%
of the Hispanic community, which is 12% of the entire population of New
York City.3' Second, the census statistics show that 25% of the
population of New York City is Hispanic and 48.1% of that population is
excluded under the language requirement of the statute.38 The exclusion
of 48.1% of Hispanics is not fair and reasonable in relation to the total
population of Hispanics in New York. 9 Third, the fact that such a large
meet their burden of demonstrating that the use of voter registration lists as a source of
names for prospective jurors was not designed to reasonably produce a jury
representative of a cross-section of the community).
31. See Butera, 420 F.2d at 569.
32. 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (affirming the position that women may not be
systematically excluded from jury service).
33. Id. at 364.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 364-65. To fulfill this part of the test defendant Duren provided the Court
with statistics showing that women made up 54% of Jackson County and women made
up only approximately 15% of the jury venires.
36. Id. at 364-67. Defendant Duren satisfied this part of the test by showing the
underrepresentation of women in every weekly venire for a period of almost a year.
37. See CENSUS, supra note 4.
38. Id.
39. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 365-67 (1979).
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percentage

°

of such a significant portion of the City's population is

automatically eliminated by statute from jury service on the basis of
language alone,41 undoubtedly qualifies as "systematic exclusion." 42 It
is highly unlikely that such a juror selection system could result in juries

that are fairly representative of the Hispanic community in New York
City.'

Therefore, the three elements set forth in Duren for establishing

a prima facie violation of the cross-section requirement are satisfied.
2. An Application of the Cognizability Principle

The members of a cognizable group must share common attitudes,
ideas, or experiences,'

and exist as "a community of interest which

cannot be adequately protected by the rest of the populace. " '

Recognizing that cognizability is not a static concept that can be precisely
defined, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declared that
"cognizability will necessarily vary with local conditions."'
For
instance, demographics may lead one group to be considered cognizable
in one geographic area, but not in another.47 Variations in geographical
representation, either between counties or between rural and urban areas,
may be significant in some districts and not in other areas."

The idea that cognizability depends on demographics and geography
formed the basis of a recent Suffolk County court opinion."' The

defendant in that case, who was both African American and American
Indian,' claimed a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial 1
40.
41.
42.
43.

See CENSUS, supra note 4.
See N.Y. JuD. LAW § 510 (McKinney 1992).
See Duren, 439 U.S. at 366-67.
See infra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.

44. See United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
45. Id. at 144.
46. United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901,903 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that neither
persons aged 18 to 34, nor persons with an education level of high school level or less
constituted a cognizable group).
47. Id. at 903-04.
48. Id. See also Taylor v. Lousiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975) (considering the
same issue, the Court wrote, "[clommunities differ at different times and places. What
is a fair cross section at one time or place is not necessarily a fair cross section at
another time or a different place.").
49. Peoplev. Hobson, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 8, 1992, at29 (Cty. Ct. Suffolk Cty.), af'd,
584 N.Y.S.2d 967 (App. Div. 1992).
50. Hobson, N.Y. L.J. at 29.
51. Id.
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and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the United
States Constitution.52 He asserted that the jury pool selection process in
Suffolk County resulted in an underrepresentation of African Americans
and American Indians. 5 The court held that the American Indian
population, which comprised only 00.2% of the county's population was
"a group too small to be considered in this analysis and whose nonappearance in the average jury panel should be expected."'
Census
statistics submitted in the case indicated that African Americans comprised
6.3% of the total Suffolk County population.55 With respect to this
figure the court said:
although blacks constitute a distinctive group in the community
... it cannot be shown that the representation of this group in

the jury pool is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number
of persons in this community or that representation was the result
of systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection
process.m
Consequently, the court denied the defendant's request for a hearing on
the issue of the county's allegedly unconstitutional jury selection practices.
C. Hispanics - A Cognizable Group

Courts have held Hispanics to be a cognizable group.57 A federal
district court in New York in United States v. Guzinan55 established
certain standards for determining whether a group should be considered
cognizable." Among its attributes, the group must have a definite
composition and its membership must not shift from day to day, nor may
its members be arbitrarily selected.' Second, there must be a "common
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 115 F. Supp. 392, 397
(D.V.1. 1953) (classifying people of Puerto Rican descent as a cognizable group);
Montoya v. People, 345 P.2d 1062 (Colo. 1959) (determining that people with Spanish
surnames are a cognizable group).
58. 337 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
59. Id. at 143-44.
60. Id. at 143.
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thread which runs through the group" and gives it cohesion.61 Finally,
there must exist the "possibility that exclusion of the group will result in
partiality or bias on the part of juries hearing cases in which group
members are involved."'
In addition to these factors, courts have
required that the group, "in some objectively discernible and significant
way, is distinct from the rest of society," ' and that the group's interests
cannot be adequately represented by other members of the populace.'
In other words, from the group's perspective, there is a kind of "internal
cohesion," ' and from society's point of view, the group is recognized
as identifiable and distinct. 66
As a group, Hispanics display the characteristics of cognizability that
are outlined in Guzman.67 In Hernandez v. Teras ' the Supreme Court,
in determining that Hispanics (specifically those of Mexican and Latin
American descent) form a cognizable group, wrote the following:
Throughout our history differences in race and color have defined
easily identifiable groups which have at times required the aid of
the courts in securing equal treatment under the laws. But
community prejudices are not static, and from time to time other
differences from the community norm may define other groups
which need the same protection. Whether such a group exists
within a community is a question of fact. When the existence of
a distinct class is demonstrated, and it is further shown that the
laws, as written or as applied, single out that class for different
treatment not based on some reasonable classification, the
guarantees of the Constitution have been violated.
The
Fourteenth Amendment is not directed solely against
discrimination due to a "two-class theory"- that is, based upon
differences between "white" and "Negro. " '
Notwithstanding the preference of some members within the larger,
overall Hispanic community for specific labels of self-expression based
upon their country of origin (referring to themselves, for example, as
61. Id.

62. Id. at 144.
63. United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1977).

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 905.
67. See United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 143-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
68. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
69. Id. at 478.
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Dominicans, Colombians, Puerto Ricans, etc.), for purposes of
cognizability, I-Ispanics constitute a separate group or class in society,
which is distinct from and identifiable by other groups in New York
City.7' In spite of their different terms of self-identification, indicating
the place from which they emigrated, communities like Dominicans and
Puerto Ricans recognize the shared cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and
historical bonds which link them together as a larger, cohesive group.71
Because of these unique characteristics, I-Ispanics are a group whose
interests cannot adequately be represented by other members of the jury
pool or panel.'
D. The Unfair Impact of the Juror Qualification Provision
of New York's Judiciary Law on Hispanics
A statute which either by definition or by administrative enforcement
denies jury service to a large segment of the population violates
constitutional guarantees.'
In Washington v. Davis74 the Supreme
Court held that disparate impact alone, without a showing of
discriminatory purpose, was not sufficient to establish a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.75 Nevertheless, while a statute such as Section
510 of the New York Judiciary Law76 may on its face appear neutral, its
effect may be the enforcement of "a clear pattern, unexplainable on
grounds other than race."'
[A] system which persistently produce[s] substantial and
recognized underrepresentations of sociologically distinct groups
would not be insulated from attack simply because it was fair on
70. David GonAlez, What's the Problem with 'Hispanic'?JustAskaELatino', N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 1992, at D6 (citing the results from the Latino National Political

Survey, in which people living in the United States in 1989 and 1990 were asked how
they identified themselves. The choices were the following: place of origin (Mexican,
Puerto Rican, Cuban); pan-ethnic names (Hispanic, Latino, Spanish, Spanish-American,
Hispano); or American. The largest percentage of those interviewed referred to
themselves by their place of origin).
71. See GonzAlez, supranote 3, at B4.
72. See United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1977).
73. See, e.g., Hernandezv. Texas, 347 U.S. 475,481-82 (1954); Strauderv. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879).
74. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
75. Id. at 241.
76. See supra note 1.
77. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977).
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its face.

Moreover, mere protestations or even evidence of

subjective good faith would not dispel the inference that those
who administer the system had purposed the results which they
knew the system was producing.78
If the result of the juror selection system bespeaks discrimination, then

regardless of the stated intention of the state jury commissioner, there is
defacto discrimination."
The New York statutory prohibition barring non-English speakers
from jury duty' creates precisely this type of de facto discrimination.

Its administration, if not its intent, impacts disproportionately on Hispanics
because, as United States Census Bureau statistics demonstrate, it results

in the exclusion from jury service of nearly fifty percent of New York
City's Hispanic population,8" which accounts for 12% of the city's total
population.' There are those who argue that such differential effects
warrant heightened judicial scrutiny because they tend to reflect

unconscious, irrational racial prejudice."
E. Jury Selection for New York's Supreme Court
New York City currently selects its jurors by randomly drawing
names from three sources: the Department of Motor Vehicles licensed
driver list," the New York State income taxpayers list," and the Board

of Elections voters registration list."

According to Norman Goodman,

78. United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 574 (1st Cir. 1970).
79. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSrTImoNALLAW704-08 (12th ed. 1991) (defining
de facto discrimination as "governmental action that is racially neutral in its language,
administration and purpose but which has a disadvantaging impact or effect").
80. See supranote 1.
81. See CENSUS, supra note 4. The figures show that 48.1% of New York City's
Hispanic population is excluded from jury service.
82. See id. The figures show that 25% of the total population of New York City
is Hispanic. The figures also show that 48.1% of the Hispanic population does not speak
English very well. Therefore, 48.1% of 25% of the total population is excluded from
jury service, equaling approximately 12% of the city's total population.
83. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, andEqual Protection:
Reckoning with UnconsciousRacism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
84. See N.Y. JuD. LAW § 506 (McKinney 1992).
85. Id.
86. Id. In 1994, § 506 of the Judiciary Law was amended to add two additional
sources of prospectivejuror names: recipients of social service assistance and recipients
of unemployment benefits. See N.Y. JuD. LAW § 506 (McKinney Supp. 1995). By
mid-summer of 1995, use of these additional sources will be incorporated into New York
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County Clerk of the Supreme Court, and Commissioner of Jurors, New
York County, juror qualification questionnaires are mailed to persons on
a list compiled from these three sources.' The completed questionnaires
are then returned to Mr. Goodman's office, and those persons not
disqualified or exempt under the Judiciary Law are placed on the county's
qualified list."
Mr. Goodman stated that it is assumed that anyone who fills out and
returns the questionnaire, which is written entirely in English, speaks
English. 9 He added, however, that such is not always the case; many
non-English speakers complete the questionnaire with the assistance of
another, and it is not until the non-English speaker is actually called for

jury duty that the determination is made that he does not speak English.'
At that point the person is dismissed from jury service. 9

Section 510 of the New York Judiciary Law' discriminates against
I-Ispanics by interfering with the exercise of their fundamental right as
citizens to perform jury duty.' Writing for the Supreme Court in Carter
City's juror selection processs. Telephone Interview with Anthony Manisero, Principal
Management Analyst, Office of Court Administration, N.Y. State Unified Court System
(Apr. 21, 1995).
87. Telephone Interview with Mr. Goodman (Oct. 5, 1992) [hereinafter Goodman].
The information is contained on the instruction sheet accompanying the questionnaire
mailed to prospective jurors. It reads: "Dear Prospective Juror: Your name has been
selected at random for future service as a juror in this county." According to
information provided by Nancy Wesley, New York State Board of Elections, Registration
Department, tax and Motor Vehicles records have been used more than those for voter
registration.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.

91. Id. In addition to random selection, New York City has had a juror "hotline"
number since October of 1993. People can call this number to offer suggestions and
comments, or to volunteer for jury service. Telephone Interview with Martha Pdrez,
Junior Court Analyst, Office of Court Administration, N.Y. State Unified Court System
(Apr. 21, 1995). Some Hispanics who call to volunteer for jury service are turned away
precisely because it is perceived that they do not speak English well enough and would
need an interpreter. id.
92. See N.Y. JuD. LAW § 510 (McKinney 1992).
93. See Penn v. Eubanks, 360 F. Supp. 699, 702 (D. Ala. 1973) (holding that
"[lury service on the part of citizens of the United States is considered under our law
in this country as one of the basic rights and obligations of citizenship. Jury service is
a form of participation in the processes of government, a responsibility and a right that
should be shared by all citizens, regardless of race or sex or income."). A standard of
strict judicial scrutiny applies to legislation that impinges upon a right deemed to be
"fundamental" by the Court. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
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v. Jury Commission of Greene County,' Justice Stewart compared jury
service to the right to vote, which is a fundamental right. The following
passage clearly expresses the status the Court ascribed to jury service:
Whether jury service be deemed a right, a privilege, or a duty,
the state may no more extend it to some of its citizens and deny
it to others . . . than it may invidiously discriminate in the
offering and withholding of the elective franchise."
The exclusion of minorities like Hispanics is contrary to the tradition and
purpose of the jury system, "to the law as an institution, to the community
at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the process of our
courts."'
The Supreme Court has consistently warned against the
danger of excluding any group from jury service. This concern was
clearly articulated in Peters v. Kiff.'
[A] State cannot, consistent with due process, subject a
defendant to indictment or trial by a jury that has been selected
in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner, in violation of the
Constitution and the laws of the United States. Illegal and
unconstitutional jury selection procedures cast doubt on the
integrity of the whole judicial process ....
[The exclusion from jury service of a substantial and
identifiable class of citizens has a potential impact that is too
subtle and too pervasive to admit of confinement to particular
issues or particular cases .... When any large and identifiable
segment of the community is excluded from jury service, the
effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature
and varieties of human experience, the range of which is
unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary to assume
that the excluded group will consistently vote as a class in order
to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury of a
1, 17 (1973) (establishing guidelines for scrutinizing legislative schemes allegedly
constituting violations of the Equal Protection Clause).
94. 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
95. Id. at 330.

96. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946).
97. 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (holding that qualified jurors cannot be excluded because
of race). Although this case was decided on due process grounds, Justice Marshall
spoke of the "kinds of harms that flow from discrimination in jury selection." Id. at
498.
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perspective on human events that may have unsuspected
importance in any case that may be presented.9
The value of including as many different groups as possible in the jury
selection process and, consequently, having the jury pool be as broadly
based as possible, cannot be overstated.'
The result will be a pool of
potential jurors who reflect a vast array of distinct attitudes, perspectives,
and experiences. 1" This assortment of outlooks and values will then be
carried over to the jury that is eventually empaneled.101 The effect is a
tendency to weaken or even eliminate any one group's biases or
prejudices." ° Furthermore, the more groups included in the process,
the greater the sense of legitimacy from both the defendant's and society's
points of view. 3 For these reasons, it is imperative that there not be
a blanket exclusion on Spanish-speaking Hispanics and other non-English
speakers.
II. WHOSE RIGHTS ARE BEING INFRINGED UPON?

A. Right of the Accused to a FairTrial
by a Jury of His Peers
Both citizens and the accused are entitled to the inclusion of
cognizable groups in the jury pool, from which the panel will be
drawn. 104
Discriminatory jury selection harms the entire
community."
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right
to a fair trial by an impartial jury of his peers. From the defendant's
perspective, the real danger in compromising the representative quality of
98. Id. at 502-04.
99. See Ballard,329 U.S. at 195.

100. See id. at 194.
101. See People v. Guzman, 478 N.Y.S.2d 455, 464 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984), afrd,
555 N.E.2d 259 (N.Y. 1990).
102. See John B. Ashby, Juror Selection and the Sixth Amendment Right to an
Impartial Jury, 11 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1137, 1138-39 (1978).

103. Id. at 1139-40.
104. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 500 (1972) (finding by Justices Marshall,
Douglas and Stewart that all defendants, whether or not they are members of the
excluded group, and those potential jurors who are members of the group systematically
excluded, have standing to attack the juror selection process).
105. See McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 968 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari,arguing that discriminatory jury selection harms the entire

community).
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the jury is that the result can be the oppression of "those accused
individuals who by chance are numbered among unpopular or inarticulate

minorities." °6 Consequently, a defendant has standing to challenge
exclusion resulting in a violation of the cross-section requirement, whether
or not he is a member of the excluded class. 7 The cross-section
requirement is not one that can be taken lightly:
We can never measure accurately the prejudice that results from
the exclusion of certain types of qualified people from a jury
panel. Such prejudice is so subtle, so intangible, that it escapes
the ordinary methods of proof. It may be absent in one case and
present in another; it may gradually and silently erode the jury
system before it becomes evident. But it is no less real or
meaningful for our purposes. If the constitutional right to a jury
impartially drawn from a cross-section of the community has been
violated, we should vindicate that right even though the effect of
the violation has not yet put in a tangible appearance. Otherwise
that right
may be irretrievably lost in a welter of evidentiary
10
rules.

In New York City it is indeed unfair that defendants are tried by juries
which fail to include a representative number of members of the nonEnglish speaking Hispanic community, given the fact that they constitute
such a significant segment of the city's population. 9
B. Citizens' Right to Jury Service
The United States and New York Constitutions guarantee citizens
certain privileges and immunities. 10 Traditionally, the right to vote and
the right to serve on a jury have been counted among the fundamental
rights of citizens."' "[Jiury service is the most direct contact that a
106. Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 408 (1945) (Murphy, J. dissenting).
107. See, e.g., Taylor v. Lousiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975) (permitting a male
defendant to raise the exclusion of women); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493,498-99 (1972)
(allowing a white defendant to challenge a conviction on the grounds that Blacks had
been systematically excluded from jury service).
108. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 300 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
109. See CENsus, supra note 4.
110. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."); U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV;
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 1.
111. See N.Y. CONS'r. art. I, § 1; People v. Kern, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 1242 (N.Y.
1990) (holding that the citizens of New York state have a civil right to serve as jurors).
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citizen has with his government and, next to voting, about the only chance
he has to participate in it as a basic decision-maker.""' New York
Civil Rights Law section 13 provides that "[n]o citizen of the state
possessing all other qualifications ...

shall be disqualified to serve as a

grand or petit juror in any court of this state on account of race, creed,
color, national origin or sex . . .

,

and the New York State

color, or previous condition of servitude."1

In Thiel v. Southern Pacific

Constitution provides for equal protection of the laws.11 4 The United
States Congress has recognized jury duty as a right, and has made
disqualification in federal or state courts a crime if it is based on race,

Co.,. 6 the Supreme Court stated that "[lury service is a duty as well
as a privilege of citizenship; it is a duty that cannot be shirked on a plea
of inconvenience or decreased earning power." 7
Courts have consistently upheld the right of
all United119States citizens
1°
1
to serve on a jury regardless

of race,

national

or

origin,'

ethnicity, 12

gender,

economic

religion, 2

status. 123

Both

government and private actions may be brought by those improperly
112. Ashby, supra note 102, at 1140.
113. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 13 (McKinney 1992).
114. N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 11.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
116. 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
117. Id. at 224.
118. See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556-57 (1979) (holding that a
criminal defendant's right to equal protection of the laws is denied when he is indicted
by a grand jury from which members of a racial group have been purposefully excluded);
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-05 (1972); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,
308 (1879).
119. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975); Ballard v. United
States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946); see also United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564,
571 (1st Cir. 1970) (holding that a 30% underrepresentation of women raised an
inference of unlawful discrimination); People v. Moss, 366 N.Y.S.2d 522,527-29 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1975) (holding that a statute entitling women to exemption from jury service
violated defendant's right to equal protection because there was no compelling state
interest that required such exemption solely for reasons of sex).
120. See United States v. Flynn, 106 F. Supp. 966, 979-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)
(prohibiting jury selection sytems that deliberately or systematically exclude people based
on sex, race, economic, occupational or social status, or religion).

121. See id.
122. See Hernandezv. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954) (holding that exclusion of

persons of Mexican descent from jury service is unconstitutional).
123. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 222 (1946).
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excluded from jury service. 12 Writing for the majority of the Supreme
Court in Duren v. Missouri,1 " Justice White emphasized:
[The constitutional guarantee to a jury drawn from a fair cross
section of the community requires that States exercise proper
caution in exempting broad categories of persons from jury
service .... [Any category expressly limited to a group in the

community of sufficient magnitude and distinctiveness so as to be

within the fair-cross-section requirement-such as women-runs
the danger of resulting in underrepresentation sufficient to
constitute

a prima facie violation

of that constitutional

requirement.12
New York City's non-English speaking Hispanics are precisely such
a group; deprived of the the fundamental right to serve jury duty by the
English
1 language requirement of section 510 of New York Judiciary

Law. 2

IV. THE STATE'S INTEREST AND ALLOCATING THE BURDEN OF PROOF

The State may prescribe juror qualifications and provide reasonable
exclusions from jury service' as "long as it may be fairly said that the

jury lists or panels are representative of the community. " ' New York
state law allows individuals in certain categories to claim exemptions from
jury service"

and also provides that members of other groups be

124. See Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970) (allowing
citizens, excluded from a jury list, to commence a suit for a violation of their civil
rights).
125. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
126. Id. at 370-71.
127. See supranote 1.
128. See, e.g., Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 331-37
(1970) (approving a statute which allows only those persons reputed to be honest,
intelligent and esteemed in the community for their integrity, good character, and sound
judgement to serve as jurors); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 296 (1947) (approving
"blue ribbon" juries for certain cases); Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638, 640 (1906)
(approving a statutory exemption for lawyers, ministers, doctors, and railroad engineers).
129. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).
130. N.Y. Jun. LAw § 512 (McKinney 1992):
Each of the following persons is exempt from service as a juror upon claiming
exemption therefrom:
1. A member of the clergy or Christian Science practitioner officiating as
such and not following any other calling;
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However, once the defendant has

challenged the empaneled jury and has established a prima facie case of

a violation of his constitutional right to a jury drawn from a cross section
of the community, "the State . . .bears the burden of justifying this

infringement by showing attainment of a fair cross section to be
incompatible with a significant state interest." 13 The State therefore
must rebut the presumption of unconstitutionality by producing enough
2. A licensed physician, dentist, pharmacist, optometrist, psychologist,
podiatrist, registered nurse, practical nurse, embalmer or a Christian Science
nurse exempt from licensing by subdivision of section sixty-nine hundred eight
of the education law, regularly engaged in the practice of his profession;
3. An attorney regularly engaged in the practice of law as a means of
livelihood;
4. A police officer as defined in section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law,
or an official or correction officer of any state correctional facility or of any
penal correctional institution who is defined as a peace officer in subdivision
twenty-five of section 2.10 of the criminal procedure law, or a member of a
fire company or department duly organized aceording to the laws of the state
or any political subdivision thereof and performing duties therein; or an
exempt volunteer fireman, as defined in section two hundred of the general
municipal law;
5. A sole proprietor or principal manager of a business, firm, association or
corporation employing fewer than three persons, not including such proprietor
or manager, who is actually engaged full-time in the operation of such business
as a means of livelihood;
6. A person seventy years of age or older;
7. A parent, guardian or other person who resides in the same household
with a child or children under sixteen years of age, and whose principal
responsibility is to actually and personally engage in the daily care and
supervision of such child or children during a majority of the hours between
eight a.m. and six p.m., excluding any period of time during which such child
or children attends school for regular instruction;
8. A person who is prosthetist or an orthotist by profession or vocation.
9. A person who is a licensed physical therapist regularly engaged in the
practice of his or her profession.
131. N.Y. Jun. LAw § 511 (MeIinney 1992):
Each of the following persons is disqualified from serving as a juror:
1. Members in active service in the armed forces of the United States;
2. Elected federal, state, city, county, town or village officers;
3. The head of a civil department of the federal, state, city, county, town or
village government, members of a public authority or state commission or
board, and the secretary to the governor;
4. A federal judge or magistrate or a judge of the unified court system.
132. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 368 (1979).
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evidence to justify its use of a particular juror qualification or
classification scheme. 1"
The State's interest is to protect the right of "Ibioth the defense and
the prosecution... to a fair trial before an impartial jury, that is, a jury
drawn from a cross-section of the community.""' Although the jury
must be competent to exercise its role as factfinder, New York courts have
recognized that the individuals selected to perform this vital task may have
limitations.135 The courts have thus upheld the right of the deaf to serve
as jurors, finding them as competent as hearing jurors.1" The Guzman
court viewed the deaf as a distinct segment of the community whose

interests must be represented on juries."

Similarly, one can argue that

the presence of Spanish-speaking Hispanics and other non-English

speaking people on New York City juries would not hinder the State in
achieving its goal of ensuring the defendant a fair trial. 3 ' On the
contrary, the inclusion of such groups would undoubtedly help the State

to better meet its objective of providing a representative
cross section of
139
the community on juries in New York City.

133. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977) (stating that once the
defendant has made out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the state to rebut that
case); see also Duren, 439 U.S. at 368 (asserting that the state has the burden ofjustifing
the infringment of an defendant's right to an impartial jury).
134. See People v. Guzman, 478 N.Y.S.2d 455, 462 (Sup. Ct. 1984), aff'd, 555
N.E.2d 259 (N.Y. 1990).
135. Guzman, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 462. (considering the jurors' limitations, the trial
court wrote that "[wle live in an imperfect world and the jury system is our imperfect
attempt to deal with that world. The best we can do is to try to find twelve citizens,
imperfect as they are, to listen, observe, consider, discuss, and reach the best verdict,
the fairest verdict, they know how, given their imperfections. That is the most we can

ask ....- )
136. See id.
137. Id. at 459-62.
138. See Guzman, 555 N.E.2d at 261-62 (stating that the equal protection right of
citizens to sit on the jury did not conflict with the due process rights to the defendant).
139. See People v. Guzman, 478 N.Y.S.2d 455, 459 (Sup. Ct. 1984) The court
stated that "exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that may have
unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented." Id at 465.
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V. ANALOGIZING THE HEARING IMPAIRED
AND NON-ENGLISH SPEAKERS: THE RIGHT TO JURY DUTY
AND THE ABILITY TO MEET ITS REQUIRENTS

In New York and other jurisdictions, the right to serve as a juror has
In People v. Guzman, 141 a
been extended to the hearing impaired."
prospective juror described
by
the
New
York Supreme Court as
"profoundly deaf," 4 2 having met all the other criteria of the juror
qualification provision of New York's Judiciary Law," was allowed to
serve as a juror." The Court of Appeals considered whether a hearing
impairment or deafness per se is a sufficient reason to disqualify
prospective jurors from jury service. 45 Agreeing with the trial court's

reasoning, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision that an otherwise
qualified deaf person may not be dismissed for cause solely on the basis
of his deafness. 16 Deaf people were held to be a cognizable group, the
members of which must be included in the pool of potential jurors." 7
In United States v. Dempsey,"8 the Tenth Circuit used identical

reasoning to find that the presence of a hearing impaired juror did not
deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial trial by jury .49

In Guzman, the Court of Appeals affirmed the New York Supreme
Courts's holding that jury service is a fundamental civil rights that is
conditioned upon one factor: an individual's ability to give the defendant
140. See, e.g., United States v. Dempsey, 830 F.2d 1084, 1090 (10th Cir. 1987),

(holding that a juror's deafness does not disqualify him from service on a federal jury);
DeLong v. Brumbaugh, 703 F. Supp. 399, 402 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (maintaining that a deaf
woman was qualified to serve as a juror); Guzman, 555 N.E.2d at 262 (holding that the
hearing impaired could not automatically be excluded from jury service).
141. 555 N.E.2d at 259.
142. See Guzman, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 457.
143. See N.Y. JuD. LAw § 510 (McKinney 1992); supra note 1.
144. See Guzman, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 462, 467 (holding that deafness did not render
a juror who could read lips and could sign English incapable of performing the functions
of a juror).
145. See Guzman, 555 N.E.2d at 260.
146. Id. at 263.
147. See Guzman, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 465, aff'd, 555 N.E.2d 259 (N.Y. 1990).
(stating that the exclusion of deaf persons from the jury pool would be contrary to state
and federal law),
148. 830 F.2d 1084 (10th Cir. 1987).
149. Id. at 1088.
150. See Guzman, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 464-65.
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a fair trial.151 Deafness did not necessarily make a person "incapable
of performing in a reasonable manner the duties of a juror."152 Hence,
such sensory impairment should not automatically be grounds for
disqualification."
In the trial court's view, the deaf juror who was
being challenged for cause by the defense, would "do as fine a job or
better than many of the hearing jurors." 5" This conclusion was reached
by the judge after having observed and listened to the potential juror
during voir dire. 155
According to the Court of Appeals, this
determination, as well as most questions concerning juror qualifications,
are matters that should be left to the trial court's discretion."s The
Court of Appeals held that the trial court's analysis and ultimate
determination was proper. 57
A. The Hearing Impaired Must be Able to
Carry Out the Duties of a Juror
In Guzman the Court of Appeals disagreed with the defendant's
contention that the deaf man in question could not perform the duties of
a reasonable juror. 58
The court enumerated those duties: "to
understand all of the evidence presented, evaluate that evidence in a
rational manner, communicate effectively with the other jurors during
deliberations, and comprehend the applicable legal principles, as instructed
by the court."'" Like the trial court, the Court of Appeals was satisfied
that the deaf individual, through the aid of an interpreter, could in fact
151. See People v. Guzman, 555 N.E.2d 259, 261 (N.Y. 1990).
152. N.Y. JuD. LAW § 510 (McKinney 1992); see also Guzman, 555 N.E.2d at
261.
153. See Guzman, 555 N.E.2d at 262.
154. Guzman, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 462; see also United States v. Dempsey, 830 F.2d

1084, (10th Cir. 1987). In comparing the deaf juror's abilities with those of the other
jurors, the circuit court stated, "[mIany jurors have somewhat less than perfect hearing
or vision, or have other limitations on their abilities to assimilate or evaluate testimony
and evidence. A defendant is not entitled to a perfect trial, but only a fair one." Id. at
1088.
155. See Guzrnan, 555 N.E.2d at 262.
156. Id. (stating that the disqualification of the juror is the trial court's decison and
is based on its own observations of the juror).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See Guzman, 555 N.E.2d at 261.
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Using similar analysis, the

Dempsey court reached the same conclusion holding that a deaf person can
"fulfill the juror's functions of understanding the evidence and fairly
evaluating [the] defendant's guilt on the charged offenses."16
B. Interpreter'sRole and Presence
The defense in Guzman objected to the use of an interpreter on several
grounds." First, the interpreter might inaccurately transmit testimony

or fail to interpret everything that is said by all parties during the
1

testimony, especially when more than one person speaks at a time. 6
The Court of Appeals' response was that there was no greater danger of
this with a deaf juror than with a hearing juror, either of whom may fail

to be alert throughout the proceedings." With respect to the question
of the interpreter's accuracy, the trial court wrote:
[The court administration should . . . examine and define the
qualifications necessary and impose standards; we should then
proceed as we do with court appointed foreign language
interpreters. When any non-English speaking witness (including
a defendant) testifies the entire jury, the judge, the attorneys, the
court reporter and, consequently, all future appellate courts, are
dependent on the English record made by that interpreter. If we

do 1not trust the skills of that person then we have no trial at
all.

5

160. Id. at 262. See generally Michael B. Goldblas, Note, Due Process: The Deaf
and the Blind as Jurors, 17 NEw ENG. L. REV. 119 (1981) (asserting that the inclusion
of the deaf and hearing impaired in jury service does not violate the defendant's due
process rights because deaf jurors are capable of effectively performing the duties and
the responsibilities of a juror with the aid of a sign language interpreter).
161. United States v. Dempsey, 830 F.2d 1084, 1089 (10th Cir. 1987). See
generally Harold Craig Manson, Comment, Jury Selection: The Courts, The Constitution,
and the Deaf, 11 PAC. L.J. 967, 983 (1980) (arguing that "actual trial experience has
shown deaf jurors to be essentially similar to hearing jurors in terms of rendering a fair
consideration of a case").
162. See Guzman, 555 N.E.2d at 262.
163. Id.
164. Id. Regarding this point, the court said it was "unlikely that mistakes or
omissions would occur with significantly greater frequency than they do with hearing
jurors, who may be distracted or inattentive at times." Id.
165. See People v. Guzman, 478 N.Y.S.2d 455, 462 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
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Second, the defense argued that the deaf juror could not evaluate the
credibility of witnesses because he could not perceive vocal inflections
tones and nuances, which are necessary to make such a determination. 1"
Not convinced that this was a disadvantage, the Court of Appeals rejected
this argument as too speculative and stated that "the ring of truth need not
be heard to be recognized."" 6
Third, the defendant asserted that the interpreter's presence would be
"too disruptive to both the trial and the deliberative process.""' The
fear was that the interpreter's presence in the jury room would inhibit
frank discussion during deliberations and violate the confidentiality of the
deliberative process."a This was also the focus of the defense argument
in Dempsey.17
The trial court in Guzman concluded that such concerns were
unsupported," and found that the interpreter would not have the effect
of stifling debate among the jurors."a
The court believed that a
competent interpreter would abide by ethical constraints," limit himself
to the neutral role of "communications facilitator," 74 and follow the
court's specific instructions and warnings against the impropriety of
participating in the jury's deliberation."17
166. See Guzman, 555 N.E.2d at 262.
167. Id.
168. See Guzman, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 460.
169. See Guzman, 555 N.E.2d at 263 (stating that the sign language interpreter's
presence would not have a negative impact on deliberations).
170. United States v. Dempsey, 830 F.2d 1084, 1089 (10th Cir. 1987) (defining
three areas of concern with respect to the interpreter's presence: whether it "would
increase the likelihood of post-trial revelations of the jury deliberations or enhance
challenges to the verdict; ... would inhibit the jury's deliberations; and. . . whether
the interpreter might unlawfully participate in the jury deliberations").
171. See Guzman, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 460.
172. See Guzman, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 462; see also Dempsey, 830 F.2d at 1090
(rejecting defense's argument of the possibility of the interpreter having a "chilling"
effect on jury deliberations). But see Eckstein v. Kirby, 452 F. Supp. 1235, 1244 (E.D.
Ark. 1978) (holding that the presence of the sign language interpreter during jury
deliberations "violates the secrecy of the jury room and thereby deprives an accused
person of their right to trial by jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution... ).
173. See Guzman, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
174. Id.
175. Id.; see also Dempsey, 830 F.2d at 1087, 1090-91 (stating that thejudge should
instruct the interpreter not to express ideas, opinions or make any observations during
jury deliberations).
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In response to the argument that non-jurors are not permitted in the

jury room during deliberations, the New York Court of Appeals called for
1 76
a flexible rather than rigid rule in order to accommodate a deaf juror
Interestingly, the court thought it was far more likely that court personnel,
such as bailiffs, would have an adverse effect on the deliberations."T
VI. ALLOWING INTERPRETERS FOR NON-ENGLISH SPEAKING JURORS
The arguments justifying the use of hearing impaired jurors apply with
equal force to non-English speakers. Like the hearing impaired, nonEnglish speaking jurors would require an interpreter throughout the

proceedings and during jury deliberations. The same ethical constraints
and competency standards required by the courts for interpreters working
with the hearing impaired and non-English speaking defendants and
witnesses would apply to interpreters working with non-English speaking
jurors. 11 The trial court would administer an oath requiring the
176. See People v. Guzman, 555 N.E.2d 259, 262 (N.Y. 1990).
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., Dempsey, 830 F.2d at 1090; Guzman, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 466. See
also CAL. R. CT. § 18.3. The Standards of Professional Conduct for Court Interpreters
are:
(a) [Accurate interpretation] A court interpreter's best skills and judgment
should be used to interpret accurately without embellishing, omitting, or
editing.
(b) [Conflicts of interest] A court interpreter should disclose to the judge and
to all parties any actual or apparent conflict of interest. Any condition that
interferes with the objectivity of an interpreter constitutes a conflict of interest.
A conflict may exist if the interpreter is acquainted with or related to any
witness or party to the action or if the interpreter has an interest in the
outcome of the case. An interpreter should not engage in conduct creating the
appearance of bias, prejudice, or partiality.
(c) [Confidentiality] A court interpreter should not disclose privileged
communications between counsel and client. A court interpreter should not
make statements about the merits of the case during the proceeding.
(d) [Giving legal advice] A court interpreter should not give legal advice-to
parties and witnesses, nor recommend specific attorneys or law firms.
(e) [Professional relationships]
A court interpreter should maintain a
professional relationship with court officers, parties, witnesses, and attorneys.
A court interpreter should strive for professional detachment.
(1) [Continuing education and duty to the profession] A court interpreter
should, through continuing education, maintain and improve his or her
interpreting skills and knowledge of procedures used by the courts. A court
interpreter should seek to elevate the standards of performance of the
interpreting profession.
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interpreter to interpret the proceedings verbatim and not interfere with the
deliberations nor reveal the confidences of the jury room.
Just as it has been argued that the cross-section requirement should be
extended to the hearing impaired,"7 so too should it include greater

numbers of Hispanics. Furthermore, fair public policy demands a move
away from automatically foreclosing members of a significant segment of
society from jury service simply because they must take an interpreter into

the jury room."s

The law should adapt to society's changing realities

and accommodate those groups in communities that may have been
ignored in the past."' In Guzman, the trial court stated:
No longer can we lump all deaf persons together and discard

them in a faceless silent heap, as in the past, on the assumption
that they are all the same-inept and unable to fulfill this

requirement of citizenship.
The truth of the matter is that "they" like blacks, Jews, and

women, to name but a few, are not all the same ...."
This reasoning could apply with equal force if "Hispanic" were
substituted for "deaf." The inclusion of these groups has the positive
effect of expanding the jury pool and ensuring defendants a jury of their

peers.'1
VII. TREATING LIKES ALIKE: THE EQUAL TREATMENT PRINCIPLE
The equal treatment principle is the substantive constitutional principle

which requires that those similarly situated will be treated alike with
179. See Eric R. Benton, Comment, ConstitutionalLaw: Systematic Exclusion in the
Jury Selection, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 160, 166 (1979) (stating that it was wrong to exclude
a group from the jury selection process because it was unfair to defendants to be tried
by a jury which lacks an important section of their communities); see Manson, supra
note 161, at 989 (arguing that a state has no justification for excluding a deaf person
from participation in jury service).
180. See Dempsey, 830 F.2d at 1091.
181. See People v. Guzman, 478 N.Y.S.2d 455, 460, 467 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
182. Id. at 460.
183. Id. at 463-65 (stating that the formerly excluded cognizable group will bring
to the jury pool their distinct experiences, and that the state can not subject a defendant
to a trial by a jury which has been selected in a discriminatory manner); see Benton
supra note 179, at 166.
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respect to legislative purpose." s Under this principle, the legislature is
free to pursue whatever purpose it chooses and the principle is invoked
only to ensure that the legislature is rationally pursuing its own stated

purposes. 1"

Judicial application of the equal treatment principle is

referred to as rationality review."

The relevant inquiry is whether a

challenged classification rationally furthers the purpose identified by the

State." s In other words, do the legislative means genuinely promote the
articulated governmental purposes? 8
If, as Guzman holds, it is incumbent upon the State to provide an

interpreter for deaf jurors, why does not the same obligation exist for
Hispanics and other non-English speaking cognizable groups of citizens?
Why should an interpreter be permitted in one set of circumstances, but
not the other? Arguably, given the interpreter's role of communication

facilitator, there would be no more danger posed by a foreign-language
interpreter than by an interpreter for the deaf."s

This appears to be a

case of likes not being treated alike, which is forbidden by the equal

treatment principle." 9

Both the Guzman and Dempsey courts minimized this issue by

insisting that what is dispositive is the fact that the deaf jurors know
English, and therefore meet the statutory language requirement for jury
184. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). In his
concurring opinion, Justice Jackson wrote, "I do not think differences of treatment under
law should be approved on classification because of differences unrelated to the
legislative purpose." Id. at 115 (Jackson, J., concurring).
185. See GUNTHER, supra note 79, at 601-03, 608-12.
186. See id. at 601-03, 608-12 (stating "that there be some 'rational' connection
between classification and objectives of the state policy statute").
187. See id. at 602-03, 609.
188. See id. at 602-03.
189. See generally U.S. v. Dempsey, 830 F.2d 1084 (10th Cir. 1987) (stating that
sign language interpreters do no inhibit jury deliberations); see also People v. Guzman,
555 N.E.2d 259, 261-62 (N.Y. 1990) (finding the sign language interpreter to be a
neutral figure, having little effect on the jurors); see supra notes 168-78 and
accompanying text.
190. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 208-10 (1976) (finding that a state statute
violated the Equal Protection Clause where it prohibited the sale of beer to males,
between the ages of 18 and 20, but permitted the sale to females in the same age group);
McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'r of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 807-09 (1969)
(stating that the classifications derived from providing a fundamental right, such as
voting, to one class of persons, yet denying the same right to another class must bear
some rational relationship to a legitimate state interest); see also GUNTHER, supra note
79, at 609-11.
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Therefore, an interpreter would sign English rather than

American Sign Language," 9 which is the functional equivalent of a
foreign language."m

This is a specious distinction because, in either

case, only the deaf juror and the interpreter know or are able to decipher

the interpreted language. 1"

One might uphold the distinction by arguing that deafness is an

immutable trait, while the inability to speak English is not. 95 However,

there are those who warn against being too quick to assume that language
acquisition is a viable possibility for everyone. 1"
"For adults in
particular, especially those with limited financial resources, learning a new
language may be extremely difficult or impossible. The immutability of
a trait suggests that courts should guard vigilantly against the traits
becoming the basis of discriminatory state actions. " '

Guzman suggested that at least one of the policies underlying Section
510 of New York's Judiciary Law is to increase the number of people

available for jury service.19

The Supreme Court has recognized the

States' interest in establishing qualifications for jury service.

99

In

Brown, Justice Reed, writing for the majority, stated that "States should
decide for themselves the quality of their juries as best fits their situation

so long as the classifications have relation to the efficiency of the jurors
and are equally administered."' Among the legislative goals of juror
191. SeeDempsey, 830 F.2d at 1087, 1091; Guzman, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 457-58,46465.
192. See Dempsey, 830 F.2d at 1087; Guzman 478 N.Y.S.2d at 457.
193. See Guznan, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 457.
194. See, e.g., Goldblas, supra note 160, at 135-38; Manson, supra note 161, at
977, n.75 (explaining that the deaf and hearing impaired communicate either through
American Sign Language, ("Sign"), which is the preferred method; "Sign-English hybrid
languages"; or by other modes of deaf communication. No matter which method is used
to communicate with English speakers, a qualified interpreter is required, just as with
any foreign language).
195. See Note, "Official English"."FederalLimits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual
Services in the States, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1345, 1354-55 (1987).
196. Id.; see also George Judson, IntegrationIsIssue of Languageand Geography,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 27, 1993, at L26 (writing that "studies suggest that Hispanic people
across the country take an extra generation to make the transition to English, in part
because... migration keeps Spanish alive in their neighborhoods").
197. See Note, supranote 195, at 1354-55.
198. See People v. Guzman, 478 N.Y.S.2d 455, 458 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
199. See, e.g., Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 332-33
(1970); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 433, 474 (1953).
200. Brown, 344 U.S. at 473 (emphasis added).
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qualification statutes are increasing the number of potential jurors 0 1 and
promotion of efficient fact-finding' while ensuring that the defendant
receives a fair trial. If these are the State's objectives, then giving deaf
people the right to serve with the benefit of an interpreter while denying
the same right and benefit to Hispanics and other non-English speakers is
per se discriminatory under equal treatment principle analysis.'
Furthermore, discrimination of this type appears to be based on ancestry
and ethnic origin (which is inextricably linked to language), and is
presumptively unconstitutional because the State has acted for an
impermissible purpose.'
In this context, the burden of proof is on the
State to rebut the presumption that it has acted for an impermissible
purpose.?
VIII. Is A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT BEING VIOLATED?

The next relevant inquiry in deciding whether an equal protection
violation exists is whether the statutory discrimination infringes upon a
fundamental right either explicitly or implicitly protected by the
Constitution.'
A right may be considered "fundamental" for
constitutional purposes whether or not it is expressly mentioned in the
Constitution.'
For example, the Supreme Court has held that
201. See People v.Guzman, 555 N.E.2d 259, 261 (N.Y. 1990) (stating that the
purpose of the statute was to eliminate automatic exclusions of disabled persons, thus
enlarging the jury pool); see supra text accompanying notes 140-447.
202. See Guzman, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 261 (stating that the statute only requires the
prospective juror to be capable of doing what jurors are supposed to do, which is to
ascertain the facts); see also Goldblas, supra note 160, at 136-38, 142-44 (noting that a
deaf individual can ascertain all of the factual information derived from the trial and
actively participate in jury deliberations through the sign language interpreter).
203. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110, 115
(1949) (holding that the state may treat individuals differently only if the classification
has a rational relationship to the legislative purpose of the statute).
204. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-82 (1954) (holding that the
exclusion of Mexican descendants from jury service, based on their national origin, is
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment).
205. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 368 (1979); San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1973); Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 481;
Eckstein v. Kirby, 452 F. Supp. 1235, 1240 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
206. See San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 17 (mandating strict judicial scrutiny for
legislation that impinges upon such a fundamental right).
207. See Eckstein, 452 F. Supp. at 1241 (stating that fundamental rights include
those rights implicitly protected by the Constitution, as opposed to constitutional rights
which are the freedom of religion, press, assembly and petition).
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fundamental rights include such rights as the first amendment right to
freedom of speech," 8 the right of a criminal defendant to due process
and a fair trial,' the right to vote,210 the right to privacy,211 and the

right to interstate travel. 212 Fundamental rights "are those that are
preservative of other rights, ... or are so basic to freedom that the Court

has felt they must be protected agaihst all statutory incursions."

213

Jury

service, which the Supreme Court has equated in importance with the right
21
to vote, 214 should be included among these fundamental rights.

Strict scrutiny, the highest standard of judicial review, is warranted
whenever a "fundamental right" is at stake.216 Questions of jury
selection
must therefore be governed by the "compelling state interest"
2 17
test.

The Supreme Court has not come up with a precise mathematical
formula2 18 for determining how "substantial" 219
the underrepresentation in the jury pool must be in order to be considered

unconstitutional.'

One test which has been used is a comparison of the

degree of representation of a particular group to that group's percentage

of the total population.

t

However, in some cases the Court has

208. See Police Dep't of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
209. See, e.g., Mayerv. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971); Tatev. Short,
401 U.S. 395, 397-399 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240-242 (1970);
Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963).
210.
Reynolds
211.
212.

See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966);
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964).
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).

213. See Jon M. Van Dyke, Jury Service Is A Fundamental Right, 2 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 27, 28 (1975).
214. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
215. See generally Van Dyke, supra note 213.
216. See id. at 27-28.
217. See id. at 27.
218. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630 (1972); Benton, supra note
179, n.51, at 165.
219. See Alexander, 405 U.S. at 630; Ashby, supra note 102, at 1152-53.
220. See, e.g., Martha Craig Daughtrey, Cross Sectionalism in Jury Selection
Proceduresafter Taylor v. Louisiana, 43 TENN. L. REV. 1, 16-17, 81 (1975); Ashby,
supra note 102, at 1152-53.
221. See Benton, supranote 179, at 164.
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shunned mathematical computations, and relied upon judicial intuition.'
New York State statutes and local practices in New York City which
result in de facto discrimination against or exclusion of Hispanics and
interfere with their exercise of a fundamental right are unconstitutional
under accepted analysis.' The jury selection procedures themselves are
not neutral; the English-language requirement discriminates against an
ethnic group and is by definition not neutral.?
A criminal defendant
"is entitled to require that the State not deliberately and systematically
deny to members of his race the right to participate as jurors in the
administration of justice."'
His right to a jury trial necessarily
includes a jury drawn from a panel which contains a representative cross
section of the community.'
Hispanic defendants in New York City are
denied this right by the English language requirements of Section 510 of
the New York's Judiciary Law.
The harm is twofold: large numbers of a class of otherwise qualified
citizens are precluded from exercising their right to participate in the
judicial process by serving jury duty,' and defendants are denied juries
that reflect a cross section of their community.'
This violates both the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The reasoning found in an 1879
Supreme Court decision regarding the right of African Americans to serve
on juries is applicable today when considering the right of non-English
speaking Hispanics to serve on a jury, for as the Court wrote:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly
denied by a statute all right to participate in the administration of
the law, as jurors, because of their color, though they are
citizens, and may be in other respects fully qualified, is
practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of
their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an
222. See id. at 165 n.51 (commenting that courts find statistical analysis refutable,
rebuttable, and too technical and elaborate).
223. See GUNTHER, supra note 79, at 704.
224. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630 (1972) (stating that "the
selection procedures themselves were not racially neutral. The racial designation on both
the questionnaire and the information card provided... for racial discrimination.").
225. Id. at 628.
226. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502-03 (1972) (holding that a
defendant is denied due process where he is tried by a jury which has purposefully
excluded a discernible race of people from jury service).
227. See supra text accompanying notes 110-27.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 104-09.
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impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal
justice which the law aims to secure to all others.'
IX. CONCLUSION

Under Section 510 of New York's Judiciary Law' ° with its Englishlanguage requirement, Hispanics (and other language minorities) cannot
exercise the fundamental right they have as citizens to participate equally
in the important judicial process of serving jury duty. They are
unconstitutionally denied equal access to that fundamental right based on
language. The State should be required to take the appropriate,
ameliorative measures necessary to help such language minorities
overcome this language barrier. This could be done by providing certified
interpreters, as has been done for the deaf and hearing impaired. 1
Assuming that the non-English speaking prospective juror is otherwise
qualified and capable of performing the duties of a juror, the most
important being the ability to provide a fair trial, there is no compelling
reason why such an individual should continue to be denied the right to
perform this very significant civil duty.'
As it now stands, the juror
qualification provision of New York's Judiciary Law predetermines the
incapacity of non-English speakers to effectively carry out the functions
of jurors.
There is no compelling policy reason or overriding state interest'
that warrants this blanket exclusion of Spanish-speaking Hispanics from
the jury pool. Just as deafness does not per se make a person incapable
of rendering satisfactory jury service, a lack of knowledge of the English
language does not in and of itself make anyone, who is otherwise
qualified, incompetent to sit on a jury.' An insufficient grasp of the
English language does not preclude a person from serving as a reasonable
juror, nor would it automatically affect the rights of the defendant. In
light of the fundamental rights being denied both non-English speaking
229. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879).
230. See supra note 1.
231. See, e.g., United States v. Dempsey, 830 F.2d 1084 (10th Cir. 1987); People
v. Guzman, N.Y.S.2d 455 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984), aft'd, 555 N.E.2d 259 (N.Y. 1990);
see also Goldblas, supra note 160, at 135-37; Manson, supra note 161, at 976-83
(suggesting that an interpreter could speak quietly into a microphone and the jurors could
wear headphones).
232. See Guzman, N.Y.S.2d at 464-65 n.38.
233. See Manson, supra note 161, at 987-88.
234. See Goldblas, supra note 160, at 133-44.
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Hispanic defendants and citizens, Section 510 of the New York's Judiciary
Law should be amended to remove the non-English speaker exclusion.
Cynthia L. Brown

